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Abstract. Exchanging mutable data objects with untrusted code is a delicate matter be-
cause of the risk of creating a data space that is accessible by an attacker. Consequently,
secure programming guidelines for Java stress the importance of using defensive copying
before accepting or handing out references to an internal mutable object. However, im-
plementation of a copy method (like clone()) is entirely left to the programmer. It may
not provide a sufficiently deep copy of an object and is subject to overriding by a mali-
cious sub-class. Currently no language-based mechanism supports secure object cloning.
This paper proposes a type-based annotation system for defining modular copy policies
for class-based object-oriented programs. A copy policy specifies the maximally allowed
sharing between an object and its clone. We present a static enforcement mechanism that
will guarantee that all classes fulfil their copy policy, even in the presence of overriding of
copy methods, and establish the semantic correctness of the overall approach in Coq. The
mechanism has been implemented and experimentally evaluated on clone methods from
several Java libraries.
1. Introduction
Exchanging data objects with untrusted code is a delicate matter because of the risk of
creating a data space that is accessible by an attacker. Consequently, secure programming
guidelines for Java such as those proposed by Sun [17] and CERT [6] stress the importance of
using defensive copying or cloning before accepting or handing out references to an internal
mutable object. There are two aspects of the problem:
(1) If the result of a method is a reference to an internal mutable object, then the receiving
code may modify the internal state. Therefore, it is recommended to make copies of
mutable objects that are returned as results, unless the intention is to share state.
(2) If an argument to a method is a reference to an object coming from hostile code, a
local copy of the object should be created. Otherwise, the hostile code may be able to
modify the internal state of the object.
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A common way for a class to provide facilities for copying objects is to implement a clone()
method that overrides the cloning method provided by java.lang.Object. The following
code snippet, taken from Sun’s Secure Coding Guidelines for Java, demonstrates how a
date object is cloned before being returned to a caller:
public class CopyOutput {
private final java.util.Date date;
...
public java.util.Date getDate() {
return (java.util.Date)date.clone(); }
}
However, relying on calling a polymorphic clone method to ensure secure copying of objects
may prove insufficient, for two reasons. First, the implementation of the clone() method
is entirely left to the programmer and there is no way to enforce that an untrusted im-
plementation provides a sufficiently deep copy of the object. It is free to leave references
to parts of the original object being copied in the new object. Second, even if the current
clone() method works properly, sub-classes may override the clone() method and replace
it with a method that does not create a sufficiently deep clone. For the above example
to behave correctly, an additional class invariant is required, ensuring that the date field
always contains an object that is of class Date and not one of its sub-classes. To quote from
the CERT guidelines for secure Java programming: “Do not carry out defensive copying
using the clone() method in constructors, when the (non-system) class can be subclassed
by untrusted code. This will limit the malicious code from returning a crafted object when
the object’s clone() method is invoked.” Clearly, we are faced with a situation where basic
object-oriented software engineering principles (sub-classing and overriding) are at odds
with security concerns. To reconcile these two aspects in a manner that provides seman-
tically well-founded guarantees of the resulting code, this paper proposes a formalism for
defining cloning policies by annotating classes and specific copy methods, and a static en-
forcement mechanism that will guarantee that all classes of an application adhere to the
copy policy. Intuitively, policies impose non-sharing constraints between the structure refer-
enced by a field of an object and the structure returned by the cloning method. Notice, that
we do not enforce that a copy method will always return a target object that is functionally
equivalent to its source. Nor does our method prevent a sub-class from making a copy of a
structure using new fields that are not governed by the declared policy. For a more detailed
example of these limitations, see Section 2.3.
1.1. Cloning of Objects. For objects in Java to be cloneable, their class must implement
the empty interface Cloneable. A default clone method is provided by the class Object:
when invoked on an object of a class, Object.clone will create a new object of that class
and copy the content of each field of the original object into the new object. The object
and its clone share all sub-structures of the object; such a copy is called shallow.
It is common for cloneable classes to override the default clone method and provide
their own implementation. For a generic List class, this could be done as follows:
public class List<V> implements Cloneable
{
public V value;
public List<V> next;
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public List(V val, List<V> next) {
this.value = val;
this.next = next; }
public List<V> clone() {
return new List(value,(next==null)?null:next.clone()); }
}
Notice that this cloning method performs a shallow copy of the list, duplicating the spine but
sharing all the elements between the list and its clone. Because this amount of sharing may
not be desirable (for the reasons mentioned above), the programmer is free to implement
other versions of clone(). For example, another way of cloning a list is by copying both
the list spine and its elements1, creating what is known as a deep copy.
public List<V> deepClone() {
return new List((V) value.clone(),
(next==null ? null : next.deepClone())); }
A general programming pattern for methods that clone objects works by first creating a
shallow copy of the object by calling the super.clone() method, and then modifying certain
fields to reference new copies of the original content. This is illustrated in the following
snippet, taken from the class LinkedList in Fig. 8:
public Object clone() { ...
clone = super.clone(); ...
clone.header = new Entry<E>(null, null, null); ...
return clone;}
There are two observations to be made about the analysis of such methods. First, an
analysis that tracks the depth of the clone being returned will have to be flow-sensitive,
as the method starts out with a shallow copy that is gradually being made deeper. This
makes the analysis more costly. Second, there is no need to track precisely modifications
made to parts of the memory that are not local to the clone method, as clone methods are
primarily concerned with manipulating memory that they allocate themselves. This will
have a strong impact on the design choices of our analysis.
1.2. Copy Policies. The first contribution of the paper is a proposal for a set of semanti-
cally well-defined program annotations, whose purpose is to enable the expression of policies
for secure copying of objects. Introducing a copy policy language enables class developers
to state explicitly the intended behaviour of copy methods. In the basic form of the copy
policy formalism, fields of classes are annotated with @Shallow and @Deep. Intuitively, the
annotation @Shallow indicates that the field is referencing an object, parts of which may
be referenced from elsewhere. The annotation @Deep(X) on a field f means that a) upon
return from clone(), the object referenced by this field f is not referenced from elsewhere,
and b) the field f is copied according to the copy policy identified by X. Here, X is either
the name of a specific policy or if omitted, it designates the default policy of the class of
the field. For example, the following annotations:
1To be type-checked by the Java compiler it is necessary to add a cast before calling clone() on value.
A cast to a sub interface of Cloneable that declares a clone() method is necessary.
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class List { @Shallow V value; @Deep List next; ...}
specifies a default policy for the class List where the next field points to a list object that
also respects the default copy policy for lists. Any method in the List class, labelled with
the @Copy annotation, is meant to respect this default policy.
In addition it is possible to define other copy policies and annotate specific copy methods
(identified by the annotation @Copy(...)) with the name of these policies. For example, the
annotation2
DL: { @Deep V value; @Deep(DL) List next;};
@Copy(DL) List<V> deepClone() {
return new List((V) value.clone(),
(next==null ? null : next.deepClone())); }
can be used to specify a list-copying method that also ensures that the value fields of a list
of objects are copied according to the copy policy of their class (which is a stronger policy
than that imposed by the annotations of the class List). We give a formal definition of the
policy annotation language in Section 2.
The annotations are meant to ensure a certain degree of non-sharing between the origi-
nal object being copied and its clone. We want to state explicitly that the parts of the clone
that can be accessed via fields marked @Deep are unreachable from any part of the heap
that was accessible before the call to clone(). To make this intention precise, we provide a
formal semantics of a simple programming language extended with policy annotations and
define what it means for a program to respect a policy (Section 2.2).
1.3. Enforcement. The second major contribution of this work is to make the developer’s
intent, expressed by copy policies, statically enforceable using a type system. We formalize
this enforcement mechanism by giving an interpretation of the policy language in which
annotations are translated into graph-shaped type structures. For example, the default
annotations of the List class defined above will be translated into the graph that is depicted
to the right in Fig. 1 (res is the name given to the result of the copy method). The left
part shows the concrete heap structure.
Unlike general purpose shape analysis, we take into account the programming method-
ologies and practice for copy methods, and design a type system specifically tailored to
the enforcement of copy policies. This means that the underlying analysis must be able to
track precisely all modifications to objects that the copy method allocates itself (directly or
indirectly) in a flow-sensitive manner. Conversely, as copy methods should not modify non-
local objects, the analysis will be designed to be more approximate when tracking objects
external to the method under analysis, and the type system will accordingly refuse methods
that attempt such non-local modifications. As a further design choice, the annotations are
required to be verifiable modularly on a class-by-class basis without having to perform an
analysis of the entire code base, and at a reasonable cost.
As depicted in Fig. 1, concrete memory cells are either abstracted as a) >out when they
are not allocated in the copy method itself (or its callee); b) > when they are just marked as
maybe-shared ; and c) circle nodes of a deterministic graph when they are locally allocated
and not shared. A single circle furthermore expresses a singleton concretization. In this
2Our implementation uses a sightly different policy declaration syntax because of the limitations imposed
by the Java annotation language.
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Figure 1. A linked structure (left part) and its abstraction (right part).
example, the abstract heap representation matches the graph interpretation of annotations,
which means that the instruction set that produced this heap state satisfies the specified
copy policy.
Technically, the intra-procedural component of our analysis corresponds to heap shape
analysis with the particular type of graphs that we have defined. Operations involving non-
local parts of the heap are rapidly discarded. Inter-procedural analysis uses the signatures
of copy methods provided by the programmer. Inheritance is dealt with by stipulating that
inherited fields retain their “shallow/deep” annotations. Redefinition of a method must
respect the same copy policy and other copy methods can be added to a sub-class. The
detailed definition of the analysis, presented as a set of type inference rules, is given in
Section 3.
This article is an extended version of a paper presented at ESOP’11 [13]. We have
taken advantage of the extra space to provide improved and more detailed explanations,
in particular of the inference mechanism and of what is exactly is being enforced by our
copy policies. We have also added details of the proof of correctness of the enforcement
mechanism. The formalism of copy policies and the correctness theorem for the core lan-
guage defined in Section 2 have been implemented and verified mechanically in Coq [1].
The added details about the proofs should especially facilitate the understanding of this
Coq development
2. Language and Copy Policies
The formalism is developed for a small, imperative language extended with basic, class-
based object-oriented features for object allocation, field access and assignment, and method
invocation. A program is a collection of classes, organized into a tree-structured class
hierarchy via the extends relation. A class consists of a series of copy method declarations
with each its own policy X, its name m, its formal parameter x and commands c to execute.
A sub-class inherits the copy methods of its super-class and can re-define a copy method
defined in one of its super-classes. We only consider copy methods. Private methods (or
static methods of the current class) are inlined by the type checker. Other method calls
(to virtual methods) are modeled by a special instruction x :=?(y) that assigns an arbitrary
value to x and possibly modifies all heap cells reachable from y (except itself). The other
commands are standard. The copy method call x :=mcn:X (y) is a virtual call. The method
to be called is the copy method of name m defined or inherited by the (dynamic) class of the
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x , y ∈ Var f ∈ Field m ∈ Meth cn ∈ Class id X ∈ Policy id
p ∈ Prog ::= cl
cl ∈ Class ::= class cn [extends cn] {pd md}
pd ∈ PolicyDecl ::= X : {τ}
τ ∈ Policy ::= (X, f)
md ∈ MethDecl ::= Copy(X) m(x ):=c
c ∈ Comm ::= x :=y | x :=y .f | x .f :=y | x :=null
| x := new cn | x :=mcn:X (y) | x :=?(y) | return x
| c; c | if (∗) then c else c fi | while (∗) do c done
Notations: We write  for the reflexive transitive closure of the subclass relation induced by a
(well-formed) program that is fixed in the rest of the paper. We write x a sequence of syntactic
elements of form x.
Figure 2. Language Syntax.
object stored in variable y. The subscript annotation cn:X is used as a static constraint. It
is supposed that the type of y is guaranteed to be a sub-class of class cn and that cn defines
a method m with a copy policy X. This is ensured by standard bytecode verification and
method resolution.
We suppose given a set of policy identifiers Policy id, ranged over by X. A copy policy
declaration has the form X : {τ} where X is the identifier of the policy signature and
τ is a policy. The policy τ consists of a set of field annotations (X, f) ; . . . where f is
a deep field that should reference an object which can only be accessed via the returned
pointer of the copy method and which respects the copy policy identified by X. The use of
policy identifiers makes it possible to write recursive definitions of copy policies, necessary
for describing copy properties of recursive structures. Any other field is implicitly shallow,
meaning that no copy properties are guaranteed for the object referenced by the field.
No further copy properties are given for the sub-structure starting at shallow fields. For
instance, the default copy policy declaration of the class List presented in Sec. 1.2 writes:
List.default : {(List.default, next)}.
We assume that for a given program, all copy policies have been grouped together in a
finite map Πp : Policy id → Policy . In the rest of the paper, we assume this map is complete,
i.e. each policy name X that appears in an annotation is bound to a unique policy in the
program p.
The semantic model of the language defined here is store-based:
l ∈ Loc
v ∈ Val = Loc ∪ {}
ρ ∈ Env = Var → Val
o ∈ Object = Field → Val
h ∈ Heap = Loc ⇀fin (Class id ×Object)
〈ρ, h,A〉 ∈ State = Env ×Heap × P(Loc)
A program state consists of an environment ρ of local variables, a store h of locations
mapping3 to objects in a heap and a set A of locally allocated locations, i.e., the locations
3We note ⇀fin for partial functions on finite domains.
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(x :=y, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ[x 7→ ρ(y)], h, A〉 (x :=null , 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ[x 7→ ], h, A〉
ρ(y) ∈ dom(h)
(x :=y.f , 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ[x 7→ h(ρ(y), f)], h, A〉
ρ(x) ∈ dom(h)
(x .f :=y, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ, h[(ρ(x), f) 7→ ρ(y)], A〉
l 6∈ dom(h)
(x := new cn, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ[x 7→ l], h[l 7→ (cn, o)], A ∪ {l}〉
(return x , 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ[ret 7→ ρ(x)], h, A〉
h(ρ(y)) = (cny , ) lookup(cny ,m) =
(
Copy(X′) m(a):=c
)
cny  cn
(c, 〈ρ[a 7→ ρ(y)], h, ∅〉) 〈ρ′, h′, A′〉
(x :=mcn:X (y), 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ[x 7→ ρ′(ret)], h′, A ∪A′〉
dom(h) ⊆ dom(h′) ∀l ∈ dom(h) \ Reachh(ρ(y)), h(l) = h′(l)
∀l ∈ dom(h) \ Reachh(ρ(y)), ∀l′ ∈ dom(h′), l ∈ Reachh′ (l′)⇒ l′ ∈ dom(h) \ Reachh(ρ(y))
v ∈ {}+ Reachh(ρ(y)) ∪ (dom(h′) \ dom(h))
(x :=?(y), 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ[x 7→ v], h′, A\Reach+h (ρ(y))〉
(c1, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 (c2, 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉) 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉
(c1; c2, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉
(c1, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉
(if (∗) then c1 else c2 fi , 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉
(c2, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉
(if (∗) then c1 else c2 fi , 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉
(while (∗) do c done, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ, h,A〉
(c; while (∗) do c done, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ′, h′, A′〉
(while (∗) do c done, 〈ρ, h,A〉) 〈ρ′, h′, A′〉
Notations: We write h(l, f) for the value o(f) such that l ∈ dom(h) and h(l) = o. We write h[(l, f) 7→ v]
for the heap h′ that is equal to h except that the f field of the object at location l now has value v. Similarly,
ρ[x 7→ v] is the environment ρ modified so that x now maps to v. The object o is the object satisfying
o(f) =  for all field f , and ρ is the environment such that ρ(x) =  for all variables x. We consider
methods with only one parameter and name it p. lookup designates the dynamic lookup procedure that,
given a class name cn and a method name m, find the first implementation of m in the class hierarchy
starting from the class of name cn and scanning the hierarchy bottom-up. It returns the corresponding
method declaration. ret is a specific local variable name that is used to store the result of each method.
Reachh(l) (resp. Reach
+
h (l)) denotes the set of values that are reachable from any sequence (resp. any
non-empty sequence) of fields in h.
Figure 3. Semantic Rules.
that have been allocated by the current method invocation or by one of its callees. This
last component does not influence the semantic transitions: it is used to express the type
system interpretation defined in Sec. 3, but is not used in the final soundness theorem. Each
object is modeled in turn as a pair composed with its dynamic class and a finite function
from field names to values (references or the specific  reference for null values). We do not
deal with base values such as integers because their immutable values are irrelevant here.
The operational semantics of the language is defined (Fig. 3) by the evaluation relation
 between configurations Comm × State and resulting states State. The set of locally
allocated locations is updated by both the x := new cn and the x :=mcn:X (y) statements.
The execution of an unknown method call x :=?(y) results in a new heap h′ that keeps all
the previous objects that were not reachable from ρ(y). It assigns the variable x a reference
that was either reachable from ρ(y) in h or that has been allocated during this call and
hence not present in h.
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2.1. Policies and Inheritance. We impose restrictions on the way that inheritance can
interact with copy policies. A method being re-defined in a sub-class can impose further
constraints on how fields of the objects returned as result should be copied. A field already
annotated deep with policy X must have the same annotation in the policy governing the
re-defined method but a field annotated as shallow can be annotated deep for a re-defined
method.
Definition 2.1 (Overriding Copy Policies). A program p is well-formed with respect to
overriding copy policies if and only if for any method declaration Copy(X ′) m(x ):= . . . that
overrides (i.e. is declared with this signature in a subclass of a class cl) another method
declaration Copy(X) m(x ):= . . . declared in cl , we have
Πp(X) ⊆ Πp(X ′).
Intuitively, this definition imposes that the overriding copy policy is stronger than the policy
that it overrides. Lemma 2.4 below states this formally.
Example 2.2. The java.lang.Object class provides a clone() method of policy {} (be-
cause its native clone() method is shallow on all fields). A class A declaring two fields f and
g can hence override the clone() method and give it a policy {(X, g)}. If a class B extends
A and overrides clone(), it must assign it a policy of the form {(X, g); . . . } and could
declare the field f as deep. In our implementation, we let the programmer leave the policy
part that concerns fields declared in superclasses implicit, as it is systematically inherited.
2.2. Semantics of Copy Policies. The informal semantics of the copy policy annotation
of a method is:
A copy method satisfies a copy policy X if and only if no memory cell that
is reachable from the result of this method following only fields with deep
annotations in X, is reachable from another local variable of the caller.
We formalize this by giving, in Fig. 4, a semantics to copy policies based on access paths.
An access path consists of a variable x followed by a sequence of field names fi separated by
a dot. An access path pi can be evaluated to a value v in a context 〈ρ, h〉 with a judgement
〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ v. Each path pi has a root variable ↓pi ∈ Var . A judgement ` pi : τ holds when
a path pi follows only deep fields in the policy τ . The rule defining the semantics of copy
policies can be paraphrased as follows: For any path pi starting in x and leading to location
l only following deep fields in policy τ , there cannot be another path leading to the same
location l which does not start in x.
Definition 2.3 (Secure Copy Method). A method m is said secure wrt. a copy signature
Copy(X){τ} if and only if for all heaps h1, h2 ∈ Heap, local environments ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Env ,
locally allocated locations A1, A2 ∈ P(Loc), and variables x, y ∈ Var ,
(x :=mcn:X (y), 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉) 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉 implies ρ2, h2, x |= τ
Note that because of virtual dispatch, the method executed by such a call may not be the
method found in cn but an overridden version of it. The security policy requires that all
overriding implementations still satisfy the policy τ .
Lemma 2.4 (Monotonicity of Copy Policies wrt. Overriding).
τ1 ⊆ τ2 implies ∀h, ρ, x, ρ, h, x |= τ2 ⇒ ρ, h, x |= τ1
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Access path syntax
pi ∈ P ::= x | pi.f
Access path evaluation
〈ρ, h〉 ` x ⇓ ρ(x) 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l h(l) = o〈ρ, h〉 ` pi.f ⇓ o(f)
Access path root
↓x = x ↓pi.f = ↓pi
Access path satisfying a policy
We suppose given Πp : Policy id → Policy the set of copy policies of the considered program p.
` x : τ
(X1 f1) ∈ τ, (X2 f2) ∈ Πp(X1), · · · , (Xn fn) ∈ Πp(Xn−1)
` x.f1. . . . .fn : τ
Policy semantics
∀pi, pi′ ∈ P, ∀l, l′ ∈ Loc, x = ↓pi, ↓pi′ 6= x,
〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l , 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi′ ⇓ l′,
` pi : τ
 implies l 6= l′
ρ, h, x |= τ
Figure 4. Copy Policy Semantics
Proof. [See Coq proof Overriding.copy policy monotony [1]]
Under these hypotheses, for all access paths pi, ` pi : τ1 implies ` pi : τ2. Thus the result
holds by definition of |=.
Thanks to this lemma, it is sufficient to prove that each method is secure wrt. its own
copy signature to ensure that all potential overridings will be also secure wrt. that copy
signature.
2.3. Limitations of Copy Policies. The enforcement of our copy policies will ensure that
certain sharing constraints are satisfied between fields of an object and its clone. However,
in the current formalism we restrict the policy to talk about fields that are actually present
in a class. The policy does not ensure properties about fields that are added in sub-classes.
This means that an attacker could copy e.g., a list by using a new field to build the list, as
in the following example.
public class EvilList<V> extends List<V>
{
@Shallow public List<V> evilNext;
public EvilList(V val, List<V> next) {
super(val,null);
this.evilNext = next; }
public List<V> clone() {
return new EvilList(value,evilNext); }
// r e d e f i n i t i o n o f a l l o ther methods to use the ev i lNext f i e l d
// in s t ead o f next
}
The enforcement mechanism described in this article will determine that the clone() method
of class EvilList respects the copy policy declared for the List class in Section 1.2 because
this policy only speaks about the next field which is set to null. It will fail to discover
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that the class EvilList creates a shallow copy of lists through the evilNext field. In order
to prevent this attack, the policy language must be extended, e.g., by adding a facility
for specifying that all fields except certain, specifically named fields must be copied deeply.
The enforcement of such policies will likely be able to reuse the analysis technique described
below.
3. Type and Effect System
The annotations defined in the previous section are convenient for expressing a copy policy
but are not sufficiently expressive for reasoning about the data structures being copied. The
static enforcement of a copy policy hence relies on a translation of policies into a graph-based
structure (that we shall call types) describing parts of the environment of local variables
and the heap manipulated by a program. In particular, the types can express useful alias
information between variables and heap cells. In this section, we define the set of types,
an approximation (sub-typing) relation v on types, and an inference system for assigning
types to each statement and to the final result of a method.
The set of types is defined using the following symbols:
n ∈N t ∈ t = N + {⊥,>out ,>}
Γ ∈ Var → t ∆ ∈∆ = N ⇀fin Field → t
Θ ∈ P(N) T ∈ T = (Var → t)×∆× P(N)
We assume given a set N of nodes. A value can be given a base type t in N + {⊥,>out ,>}.
A node n means the value has been locally allocated and is not shared. The symbol ⊥
means that the value is equal to the null reference . The symbol >out means that the
value contains a location that cannot reach a locally allocated object. The symbol > is
the specific “no-information” base type. As is standard in analysis of memory structures,
we distinguish between nodes that represent exactly one memory cell and nodes that may
represent several cells. If a node representing only one cell has an edge to another node,
then this edge can be forgotten and replaced when we assign a new value to the node—this
is called a strong update. If the node represents several cells, then the assignment may not
concern all these cells and edges cannot be forgotten. We can only add extra out-going
edges to the node—this is termed a weak update. In the graphical representations of types,
we use singly-circled nodes to designate ”weak” nodes and doubly-circled nodes to represent
”strong” nodes.
A type is a triplet T = (Γ,∆,Θ) ∈ T where
Γ: is a typing environment that maps (local) variables to base types.
∆: is a graph whose nodes are elements of N . The edges of the graphs are labeled
with field names. The successors of a node is a base type. Edges over-approximate
the concrete points-to relation.
Θ: is a set of nodes that represents necessarily only one concrete cell each. Nodes in Θ
are eligible to strong update while others (weak nodes) can only be weakly updated.
Example 3.1. The default List policy of Sec. 1.2 translates into the type
Γ = [res 7→ n1, this 7→ >out ]
∆ = [(n1, next) 7→ n2, (n2, next) 7→ n2, (n1, value) 7→ >, (n2, value) 7→ >]
Θ = {n1}.
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As mentioned in Sec 1.3, this type enjoys a graphic representation corresponding to the
right-hand side of Fig. 1.
In order to link types to the heap structures they represent, we will need to state
reachability predicates in the abstract domain. Therefore, the path evaluation relation is
extended to types using the following inference rules:
(Γ,∆) ` x ⇓ Γ(x)
(Γ,∆) ` pi ⇓ n
(Γ,∆) ` pi.f ⇓ ∆[n, f ]
(Γ,∆) ` pi ⇓ >
(Γ,∆) ` pi.f ⇓ >
(Γ,∆) ` pi ⇓ >out
(Γ,∆) ` pi.f ⇓ >out
Notice both >out and > are considered as sink nodes for path evaluation purposes 4.
3.1. From Annotation to Type. The set of all copy policies Πp ⊆ PolicyDecl can be
translated into a graph ∆p as described hereafter. We assume a naming process that
associates to each policy name X ∈ Policy id of a program a unique node n′X ∈N .
∆p =
⋃
X:{(X1,f1);...;(Xk,fk)}∈Πp
[
(n′X , f1) 7→ n′X1 , · · · , (n′X , fk) 7→ n′Xk
]
Given this graph, a policy τ = {(X1, f1); . . . ; (Xk, fk)} that is declared in a class cl is
translated into a triplet:
Φ(τ) =
(
nτ ,∆p ∪
[
(nτ , f1) 7→ n′X1 , · · · , (nτ , fk) 7→ n′Xk
]
, {nτ}
)
Note that we unfold the possibly cyclic graph ∆p with an extra node nτ in order to be
able to catch an alias information between this node and the result of a method, and hence
declare nτ as strong. Take for instance the type in Fig. 1: were it not for this unfolding
step, the type would have consisted only in a weak node and a > node, with the variable
res mapping directly to the former. Note also that it is not necessary to keep (and even to
build) the full graph ∆p in Φ(τ) but only the part that is reachable from nτ .
3.2. Type Interpretation. The semantic interpretation of types is given in Fig. 5, in the
form of a relation
〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (Γ,∆,Θ)
that states when a local allocation history A, a heap h and an environment ρ are coherent
with a type (Γ,∆,Θ). The interpretation judgement amounts to checking that (i) for
every path pi that leads to a value v in the concrete memory and to a base type t in the
graph, t is a correct description of v, as formalized by the auxiliary type interpretation
〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ,∆)  v ∼ t; (ii) every strong node in Θ represents a uniquely reachable value
in the concrete memory. The auxiliary judgement 〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ,∆)  v ∼ t is defined by
case on t. The null value is represented by any type. The symbol > represents any value
and >out those values that do not allow to reach a locally allocated location. A node n
represents a locally allocated memory location l such that every concrete path pi that leads
to l in 〈ρ, h〉 leads to node n in (Γ,∆).
We now establish a semantic link between policy semantics and type interpretation.
We show that if the final state of a copy method can be given a type of the form Φ(τ) then
this is a secure method wrt. the policy τ .
4The sink nodes status of > (resp. >out) can be understood as a way to state the following invariant
enforced by our type system: when a cell points to an unspecified (resp. foreign) part of the heap, all
successors of this cell are also unspecified (resp. foreign).
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Auxiliary type interpretation
〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ,∆)   ∼ t 〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ,∆)  v ∼ >
Reachh(l) ∩A = ∅
〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ,∆)  l ∼ >out
l ∈ A n ∈ dom(∆) ∀pi, 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l ⇒ 〈Γ,∆〉 ` pi ⇓ n
〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ,∆)  l ∼ n
Main type interpretation
∀pi,∀t, ∀v,
(Γ,∆) ` pi ⇓ t
〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ v
}
⇒ 〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ,∆)  v ∼ t
∀n ∈ Θ, ∀pi,∀pi′, ∀l,∀l′,
(Γ,∆) ` pi ⇓ n ∧ (Γ,∆) ` pi′ ⇓ n
〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l ∧ 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi′ ⇓ l′
}
⇒ l = l′
〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (Γ,∆,Θ)
Figure 5. Type Interpretation
Value sub-typing judgment
t ∈ t
⊥ ≤σ t
t ∈ t\N
t ≤σ > >out ≤σ >out
n ∈N
n ≤σ σ(n)
Main sub-typing judgment
σ ∈ dom(∆1)→ dom(∆2) + {>} (ST1)
∀t1 ∈ t, ∀pi ∈ P, (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ t1 ⇒ ∃t2 ∈ t, t1 ≤σ t2 ∧ (Γ2,∆2) ` pi ⇓ t2 (ST2)
∀n2 ∈ Θ2, ∃n1 ∈ Θ1, σ−1(n2) = {n1} (ST3)
(Γ1,∆1,Θ1) v (Γ2,∆2,Θ2)
Figure 6. Sub-typing
Theorem 3.2. Let Φ(τ) = (nτ ,∆τ ,Θτ ), ρ ∈ Env , A ∈ P(Loc), and x ∈ Var. Assume
that, for all y ∈ Var such that y is distinct from x, A is not reachable from ρ(y) in a
given heap h, i.e. Reachh(ρ(y)) ∩ A = ∅. If there exists a state of the form 〈ρ′, h, A〉, a
return variable res and a local variable type Γ′ such that ρ′(res) = ρ(x), Γ′(res) = nτ and
〈ρ′, h, A〉 ∼ (Γ′,∆τ ,Θτ ), then ρ, h, x |= τ holds.
Proof. [See Coq proof InterpAnnot.sound annotation to type [1]]
We consider two paths pi′ and x.pi such that ↓pi′ 6= x, 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi′ ⇓ l, ` x.pi : τ ,
〈ρ, h〉 ` x.pi ⇓ l and look for a contradiction. Since ` x.pi : τ and Γ′(res) = nτ , there exists
a node n ∈ ∆τ such that (Γ′,∆τ ) ` res.pi ⇓ n. Furthermore 〈ρ′, h〉 ` res.pi ⇓ l so we can
deduce that l ∈ A. Thus we obtain a contradiction with 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi′ ⇓ l because any path
that starts from a variable other than x cannot reach the elements in A.
3.3. Sub-typing. To manage control flow merge points we rely on a sub-typing relation
v described in Fig. 6. A sub-type relation (Γ1,∆1,Θ1) v (Γ2,∆2,Θ2) holds if and only if
(ST1) there exists a fusion function σ from dom(∆1) to dom(∆2)+{>}. σ is a mapping that
merges nodes and edges in ∆1 such that (ST2) every element t1 of ∆1 accessible from a path
pi is mapped to an element t2 of ∆2 accessible from the same path, such that t1 ≤σ t2. In
particular, this means that all successors of t1 are mapped to successors of t2. Incidentally,
because > acts as a sink on paths, if t1 is mapped to >, then all its successors are mapped
to > too. Finally, when a strong node in ∆1 maps to a strong node in ∆2, this image node
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cannot be the image of any other node in ∆1—in other terms, σ is injective on strong nodes
(ST3).
Intuitively, it is possible to go up in the type partial order either by merging, or by
forgetting nodes in the initial graph. The following example shows three ordered types and
their corresponding fusion functions. On the left, we forget the node pointed to by y and
hence forget all of its successors (see (ST2)). On the right we fusion two strong nodes to
obtain a weak node.
f
x
f ! x f
f
x
f
f
y
f !
!σ1 !σ2
The logical soundness of this sub-typing relation is formally proved with two intermediate
lemmas. The first one states that paths are preserved between subtypes, and that they
evaluate into basetypes that are related by the subtyping function.
Lemma 3.3 (Pathing in subtypes). Assume 〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (T1), and let σ be the fusion map
defined by the assertion T1 v T2. For any pi, r such that 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ r, for any t2 such that
(Γ2,∆2) ` pi ⇓ t2:
∃t1 ≤σ t2, (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ t1.
Proof. [See Coq proof Misc.Access Path Eval subtyp [1]] The proof follows directly
from the definition of type interpretation and subtyping.
The second lemma gives a local view on logical soundness of subtyping.
Lemma 3.4 (Local logical soundness of subtyping). Assume (Γ1,∆1,Θ1) v (Γ2,∆2,Θ2),
and let v be a value and t1, t2 some types.
〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  v ∼ t1 and t1 vσ t2 implies 〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ2,∆2)  v ∼ t2.
Proof. [See Coq proof Misc.Interp monotone [1]] We make a case for each rules of
t1 vσ t2. The only non-trivial case is for v = l ∈ Loc, t1 = n ∈N and t2 = σ(n) ∈ dom(∆2).
In this case we have to prove ∀pi, 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l ⇒ (Γ2,∆2) ` pi ⇓ σ(n). Given such a path
pi, the hypothesis 〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  l ∼ n gives us (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ n. Then subtyping
hypothesis ST2 gives us a base type t
′
2 such that n vσ t′2 and (Γ2,∆2) ` pi ⇓ t′2. But
necessarily t2 = t
′
2 so we are done.
The logical soundness of this sub-typing relation is then formally proved with the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 3.5. For any type T1, T2 ∈ T and 〈ρ, h,A〉 ∈ State, T1 v T2 and 〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (T1)
imply 〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (T2).
Proof. [See Coq proof InterpMonotony.Interpretation monotone [1]]
We suppose T1 is of the form (Γ1,∆1,Θ1) and T2 of the form (Γ2,∆2,Θ2). From
the definition of the main type interpretation (Fig 5), we reduce the proof to proving the
following two subgoals.
First, given a path pi, a base type t2 and a value v such that 〈Γ2,∆2〉 ` pi ⇓ t2 and
〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ v, we must prove that 〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ2,∆2)  v ∼ t2 holds. Since (Γ1,∆1,Θ1) v
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(Γ2,∆2,Θ2), there exists, by Lemma 3.3, a base type t1 such that (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ t1 and
t1 vσ t2. Since 〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (T1) holds we can argue that 〈ρ, h,A〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  v ∼ t1 holds
too and conclude with Lemma 3.4.
Second, given a strong node n2 ∈ Θ2, two paths pi and pi′ and two locations l and l′ such
that (Γ2,∆2) ` pi ⇓ n2, (Γ2,∆2) ` pi′ ⇓ n2, 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l and 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l′, we must prove
that l = l′. As previously, there exists by Lemma 3.3, t1 and t′1 such that (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ t1,
t1 vσ n2, (Γ1,∆1) ` pi′ ⇓ t′1 and t′1 vσ n2. But then, by (ST3), there exists some strong
node n1 such that t1 = t
′
1 = n1 and we can obtain the desired equality from the hypothesis
〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (Γ1,∆1,Θ1).
3.4. Type and Effect System. The type system verifies, statically and class by class,
that a program respects the copy policy annotations relative to a declared copy policy. The
core of the type system concerns the typability of commands, which is defined through the
following judgment:
Γ,∆,Θ ` c : Γ′,∆′,Θ′.
The judgment is valid if the execution of command c in a state satisfying type (Γ,∆,Θ)
will result in a state satisfying (Γ′,∆′,Θ′) or will diverge.
Typing rules are given in Fig. 7. We explain a selection of rules below. The rules for
if (∗) then else fi , while (∗) do done, sequential composition and most of the assignment
rules are standard for flow-sensitive type systems. The rule for x := new “allocates” a
fresh node n with no edges in the graph ∆ and let Γ(x) references this node.
There are two rules concerning the instruction x .f :=y for assigning values to fields.
Assume that the variable x is represented by node n (i.e., Γ(x) = n). In the first case
(strong update), the node is strong and we update destructively (or add) the edge in the
graph ∆ from node n labeled f to point to the value of Γ(y). The previous edge (if any) is
lost because n ∈ Θ ensures that all concrete cells represented by n are affected by this field
update. In the second case (weak update), the node is weak. In order to be conservative, we
must merge the previous shape with its updated version since the content of x.f is updated
but an other cell mays exist and be represented by n without being affected by this field
update.
As for method calls m(y), two cases arise depending on whether the method m is copy-
annotated or not. In each case, we also reason differently depending on the type of the
argument y . If a method is associated with a copy policy τ , we compute the corresponding
type (nτ ,∆τ ) and type the result of x :=mcn:X (y) starting in (Γ,∆,Θ) with the result type
consisting of the environment Γ where x now points to nτ , the heap described by the disjoint
union of ∆ and ∆τ . In addition, the set of strong nodes is augmented with nτ since a copy
method is guaranteed to return a freshly allocated node. The method call may potentially
modify the memory referenced by its argument y , but the analysis has no means of tracking
this. Accordingly, if y is a locally allocated memory location of type n, we must remove all
nodes reachable from n, and set all the successors of n to >. The other case to consider is
when the method is not associated with a copy policy (written x :=?(y)). If the parameter
y is null or not locally allocated, then there is no way for the method call to access locally
allocated memory and we know that x points to a non-locally allocated object. Otherwise,
y is a locally allocated memory location of type n, and we must kill all its successors in the
abstract heap.
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Command typing rules
Γ,∆,Θ ` x :=y : Γ[x 7→ Γ(y)],∆,Θ
n fresh in ∆
Γ,∆,Θ ` x := new cn : Γ[x 7→ n],∆[(n, ) 7→ ⊥],Θ ∪ {n}
Γ(y) = t t ∈ {>out ,>}
[Γ,∆,Θ] ` x :=y.f : Γ[x 7→ t],∆,Θ
Γ(y) = n
Γ,∆,Θ ` x :=y.f : Γ[x 7→ ∆[n, f ]],∆,Θ
Γ(x) = n n ∈ Θ
Γ,∆,Θ ` x .f :=y : Γ,∆[n, f 7→ Γ(y)],Θ
Γ(x) = n n 6∈ Θ (Γ,∆[n, f 7→ Γ(y)],Θ) v (Γ′,∆′,Θ′) (Γ,∆,Θ) v (Γ′,∆′,Θ′)
Γ,∆,Θ ` x .f :=y : Γ′,∆′,Θ′
Γ,∆,Θ ` c1 : Γ1,∆1,Θ1 (Γ1,∆1,Θ1) v (Γ′,∆′,Θ′)
Γ,∆,Θ ` c2 : Γ2,∆2,Θ2 (Γ2,∆2,Θ2) v (Γ′,∆′,Θ′)
Γ,∆,Θ ` if (∗) then c1 else c2 fi : Γ′,∆′,Θ′
Γ′,∆′,Θ′ ` c : Γ0,∆0,Θ0 (Γ,∆,Θ) v (Γ′,∆′,Θ′) (Γ0,∆0,Θ0) v (Γ′,∆′,Θ′)
Γ,∆,Θ ` while (∗) do c done : Γ′,∆′,Θ′
Γ,∆,Θ ` c1 : Γ1,∆1,Θ1 Γ1,∆1,Θ1 ` c2 : Γ2,∆2,Θ2
Γ,∆,Θ ` c1; c2 : Γ2,∆2,Θ2
Πp(X) = τ Φ(τ) = (nτ ,∆τ ) nodes(∆) ∩ nodes(∆τ ) = ∅ (Γ(y) = ⊥) ∨ (Γ(y) = >out )
Γ,∆,Θ ` x :=mcn:X (y) : Γ[x 7→ nτ ],∆ ∪∆τ ,Θ ∪ {nτ}
Πp(X) = τ Φ(τ) = (nτ ,∆τ ) nodes(∆) ∩ nodes(∆τ ) = ∅
KillSuccn(Γ,∆,Θ) = (Γ
′,∆′,Θ′) Γ(y) = n
Γ,∆,Θ ` x :=mcn:X (y) : Γ′[x 7→ nτ ],∆′ ∪∆τ ,Θ′ ∪ {nτ}
(Γ(y) = ⊥) ∨ (Γ(y) = >out )
Γ,∆,Θ ` x :=?(y) : Γ[x 7→ >out ],∆,Θ
KillSuccn(Γ,∆,Θ) = (Γ
′,∆′,Θ′) Γ(y) = n
Γ,∆,Θ ` x :=?(y) : Γ′[x 7→ >out ],∆′,Θ′
Γ,∆,Θ ` return x : Γ[ret 7→ Γ(x)],∆,Θ
Method typing rule
[ · 7→ ⊥][x 7→ >out ], ∅, ∅ ` c : Γ,∆,Θ
Πp(X) = τ Φ(τ) = (nτ ,∆τ ) (Γ,∆,Θ) v (Γ′,∆τ , {nτ}) Γ′(ret) = nτ
` Copy(X) m(x):=c
Program typing rule
∀cl ∈ p, ∀md ∈ cl , ` md
` p
Notations: We write ∆[(n, ) 7→ ⊥] for the update of ∆ with a new node n for which all successors are
equal to ⊥. We write KillSuccn for the function that removes all nodes reachable from n (with at least one
step) and sets all its successors equal to >.
Figure 7. Type System
Finally, the rule for method definition verifies the coherence of the result of analysing
the body of a method m with its copy annotation Φ(τ). Type checking extends trivially to
all methods of the program.
Note the absence of a rule for typing an instruction x .f :=y when Γ(x ) = > or >out . In
a first attempt, a sound rule would have been
Γ(x ) = >
Γ,∆ ` x .f :=y : Γ,∆[ ·, f 7→ >]
Because x may point to any part of the local shape we must conservatively forget all
knowledge about the field f . Moreover we should also warn the caller of the current method
that a field f of his own local shape may have been updated. We choose to simply reject
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1 class LinkedList<E> implements Cloneable {
2 private @Deep Entry<E> header;
3
4 private static class Entry<E> {
5 @Shallow E element;
6 @Deep Entry<E> next;
7 @Deep Entry<E> previous;
8 }
9
10 @Copy public Object clone() {
11 LinkedList<E> clone = null;
12 clone = (LinkedList<E>) super.clone();
13 clone.header = new Entry<E>;
14 clone.header.next = clone.header;
15 clone.header.previous = clone.header;
16 Entry<E> e = this.header.next;
17 while (e != this.header) {
18 Entry<E> n = new Entry<E>;
19 n.element = e.element;
20 n.next = clone.header;
21 n.previous = clone.header.previous;
22 n.previous.next = n;
23 n.next.previous = n;
24 e = e.next;
25 }
26 return clone;
27 }
28 }
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Figure 8. Intermediate Types for java.util.LinkedList.clone()
copy methods with such patterns. Such a policy is strong but has the merit to be easily
understandable to the programmer: a copy method should only modify locally allocated
objects to be typable in our type system. For similar reasons, we reject methods that
attempt to make a method call on a reference of type > because we can not track side effect
modifications of such methods without losing the modularity of the verification mechanism.
Example 3.6 (Case Study: java.util.LinkedList). In this example, we demonstrate the
use of the type system on a challenging example taken from the standard Java library.
The companion web page provides a more detailed explanation of this example [1]. The
class java.util.LinkedList provides an implementation of doubly-linked lists. A list is
composed of a first cell that points through a field header to a collection of doubly-linked
cells. Each cell has a link to the previous and the next cell and also to an element of
(parameterized) type E. The clone method provided in java.lang library implements a
“semi-shallow” copy where only cells of type E may be shared between the source and the
result of the copy. In Fig. 8 we present a modified version of the original source code:
we have inlined all method calls, except those to copy methods and removed exception
handling that leads to an abnormal return from the method5. Note that there was one
method call in the original code that was virtual and hence prevented inlining. It has been
5Inlining is automatically performed by our tool and exception control flow graph is managed as standard
control flow but omitted here for simplicity.
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necessary to make a private version of this method. This makes sense because such a virtual
call actually constitutes a potentially dangerous hook in a cloning method, as a re-defined
implementation could be called when cloning a subclass of Linkedlist.
In Fig. 8 we provide several intermediate types that are necessary for typing this method
(Ti is the type before executing the instruction at line i). The call to super.clone at line
12 creates a shallow copy of the header cell of the list, which contains a reference to the
original list. The original list is thus shared, a fact which is represented by an edge to >out
in type T13.
The copy method then progressively constructs a deep copy of the list, by allocat-
ing a new node (see type T14) and setting all paths clone.header, clone.header.next
and clone.header.previous to point to this node. This is reflected in the analysis by
a strong update to the node representing path clone.header to obtain the type T16 that
precisely models the alias between the three paths clone.header, clone.header.next and
clone.header.previous (the Java syntax used here hides the temporary variable that is
introduced to be assigned the value of clone.header and then be updated).
This type T17 is the loop invariant necessary for type checking the whole loop. It is
a super-type of T16 (updated with e 7→ >out) and of T24 which represents the memory at
the end of the loop body. The body of the loop allocates a new list cell (pointed to by
variable n) (see type T19) and inserts it into the doubly-linked list. The assignment in line
22 updates the weak node pointed to by path n.previous and hence merges the strong node
pointed to by n with the weak node pointed to by clone.header, representing the spine of
the list. The assignment at line 23 does not modify the type T23.
Notice that the types used in this example show that a flow-insensitive version of the
analysis could not have found this information. A flow-insensitive analysis would force the
merge of the types at all program points, and the call to super.clone return a type that is
less precise than the types needed for the analysis of the rest of the method.
3.5. Type soundness. The rest of this section is devoted to the soundness proof of the type
system. We consider the types T = (Γ,∆,Θ), T1 = (Γ1,∆1,Θ1), T2 = (Γ2,∆2,Θ2) ∈ T , a
program c ∈ Prog , as well as the configurations 〈ρ, h,A〉, 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉, 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉 ∈ State.
Assignments that modify the heap space can also modify the reachability properties
of locations. This following lemma indicates how to reconstruct a path to lf in the initial
heap from a path pi′ to a given location lf in the assigned heap.
Lemma 3.7 (Path decomposition on assigned states). Assume given a path pi, field f , and
locations l, l′ such that 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ l′. and assume that for any path pi′ and a location lf we
have 〈ρ, h[l, f 7→ l′]〉 ` pi′ ⇓ lf . Then, either
〈ρ, h〉 ` pi′ ⇓ lf
or ∃piz, pi1, . . . , pin, pif such that:
pi′ = piz.f.pi1.f. . . . .f.pin.f.pif
〈ρ, h〉 ` piz ⇓ l
〈ρ, h〉 ` pi.pif ⇓ lf
∀pi1, . . . , pin, 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi.pii ⇓ l
The second case of the conclusion of this lemma is illustrated in Fig. 9.
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(a) in 〈ρ, h〉
¼'
(b) in 〈ρ, h[l, f 7→ l′]〉
Figure 9. An Illustration of Path Decomposition on Assigned States.
Proof. [See Coq proof Misc.Access Path Eval putfield case [1]] The proof is
done by induction on pi.
We extend the previous lemma to paths in both the concrete heap and the graph types.
Lemma 3.8 (Pathing through strong field assignment). Assume 〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (Γ,∆,Θ) with
ρ(x) = lx ∈ A, Γ(x) = nx ∈ Θ, ρ(y) = ly, and Γ(y) = ty. Additionally, suppose that for
some path pi, value v, and type t:
〈ρ, h[lx, f 7→ ly]〉 ` pi ⇓ v
(Γ,∆[nx, f 7→ ty]) ` pi ⇓ t.
Then at least one of the following four statements hold:
(〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ v ∧ (Γ,∆) ` pi ⇓ t) (1)(∃pi′, 〈ρ, h〉 ` y.pi′ ⇓ v ∧ (Γ,∆) ` y.pi′ ⇓ t) (2)
t = > (3)
v =  (4)
Proof. [See Coq proof Misc.strong subst prop [1]] The non-trivial part of the lemma
concerns the situation when t 6= > and v 6= ). In that case, the proof relies on Lemma 3.7.
The two parts of the disjunction in Lemma 3.7 are used to prove one of the two first
statements. If the first part of the disjunction holds, we can assume that 〈ρ, h〉 ` pi ⇓ v.
Then, since 〈ρ, h,A〉 ∼ (Γ,∆,Θ), we also have (Γ,∆) ` pi ⇓ t. This implies the first main
statement. If the second part of the disjunction holds, then, by observing that 〈ρ, h〉 ` y ⇓ ly,
we can derive the sub-statement ∃pif , 〈ρ, h〉 ` y.pif ⇓ v. As previously, by assumption we
also have (Γ,∆) ` y.pif ⇓ t, which implies our second main statement.
We first establish a standard subject reduction theorem and then prove type soundness.
We assume that all methods of the considered program are well-typed.
Theorem 3.9 (Subject Reduction). Assume T1 ` c : T2 and 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 ∼ T1.
If (c, 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉) 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉 then 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉 ∼ T2.
Proof. [See Coq proof Soundness.subject reduction [1]] The proof proceeds by
structural induction on the instruction c. For each reduction rule concerning c (Fig. 3),
we prove that the resulting state is in relation to the type T2, as defined by the main type
interpretation rule in Fig. 5. This amounts to verifying that the two premises of the type
interpretation rule are satisfied. One premise checks that all access paths lead to related
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(value,node) pairs. The other checks that all nodes that are designated as “strong” in the
type interpretation indeed only represent unique locations.
We here present the most intricate part of the proof, which concerns graph nodes
different from >, ⊥, or >out , and focus here on variable and field assignment. The entire
proof has been checked using the Coq proof management system.
If c ≡ x :=y then 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉 = 〈ρ1[x 7→ ρ1(y)], h1, A1〉. In (ρ2, h2,Γ2,∆2) take a path
x.pi: since ρ2(x) = ρ1(y) and Γ2(x) = Γ1(y), y.pi is also a path in (ρ1, h1,Γ1,∆1). Given that
〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 ∼ (Γ1,∆1,Θ1), we know that y.pi will lead to a value v (formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi ⇓
v) and a node n (formally, (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pi ⇓ n) such that 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  v ∼ n. The
two paths being identical save for their prefix, this property also holds for x.pi (formally,
〈ρ1[x 7→ ρ1(y)], h1, A1〉 , (Γ1[x 7→ Γ1(y)],∆1)  v ∼ n, 〈ρ1[x 7→ ρ1(y)], h1〉 ` x.pi ⇓ v, and
(Γ1[x 7→ Γ1(y)],∆1) ` x.pi ⇓ n). Paths not beginning with x are not affected by the
assignment, and so we can conclude that the first premise is satisfied.
For the second premise, let n ∈ Θ2 and assume that n can be reached by two paths pi
and pi′ in ∆2. If none or both of the paths begin with x then, by assumption, the two paths
will lead to the same location in h2 = h1. Otherwise, suppose that, say, pi begins with x and
pi′ with a different variable z and that they lead to l and l′ respectively. Since Γ2(x) = Γ1(y)
and ∆2 = ∆1, then by assumption there is a path pi
′′ in (ρ1, h1,∆1,Γ1) that starts with y,
and such that 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi′′ ⇓ l. As z is not affected by the assignment, we also have that
〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi′ ⇓ l′. Therefore, as n ∈ Θ1 and 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 ∼ (Γ1,∆1,Θ1), we can conclude
that l = l′. This proves that 〈ρ1[x 7→ ρ1(y)], h1, A1〉 ∼ (Γ1[x 7→ Γ1(y)],∆1,Θ1).
If c ≡ x .f :=y then 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉 = 〈ρ1, h1[(ρ1(x), f) 7→ ρ1(y)], A1〉. Two cases arise,
depending on whether n = Γ(x) is a strong or a weak node.
If c ≡ x .f :=y and n = Γ(x) ∈ Θ the node n represents a unique concrete cell in h. To
check the first premise, we make use of Lemma 3.8 on a given path pi, a node n and a
location l such that (Γ2,∆2) ` pi ⇓ n and 〈ρ2, h2〉 ` pi ⇓ l. This yields one of two main
hypotheses. In the first case pi is not modified by the f -redirection (formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi ⇓
l ∧ (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ n), and by assumption 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  l ∼ n. Now consider any
path pi0 such that 〈ρ2, h2〉 ` pi0 ⇓ l: there is a node n0 such that (ρ2, h2) ` pi0 ⇓ n0, and we
can reapply Lemma 3.8 to find that 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  l ∼ n0. Hence n0 = n, and since
nodes in ∆1 and ∆2 are untouched by the field assignment typing rule, we can conclude
that the first premise is satisfied. In the second case (pi is modified by the f -redirection)
there is a path pi′ in (ρ1, h1,Γ1,∆1) such that y.pi′ leads respectively to l and n (formally
〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi′ ⇓ l ∧ (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pi′ ⇓ n). As in the previous case, for any path pi0 such
that 〈ρ2, h2〉 ` pi0 ⇓ l and (ρ2, h2) ` pi0 ⇓ n0, we have 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  l ∼ n0, which
implies that n = n0, and thus we can conclude that pi0 leads to the same node as pi, as
required.
For the second premise, let n ∈ Θ2 and assume that n can be reached by two paths
pi and pi′ in ∆2. The application of Lemma 3.8 to both of these paths yields the following
combination of cases:
neither path is modified by the f-redirection: formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi ⇓ l ∧ (Γ1,∆1) `
pi ⇓ n ∧ 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi′ ⇓ l′ ∧ (Γ1,∆1) ` pi′ ⇓ n. By assumption, l = l′.
one of the paths is modified by the f-redirection: without loss of generality, assume
〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi′ ⇓ l′ ∧ (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ n, and there is a path pi? in (ρ1, h1,Γ1,∆1) such that
y.pi? leads to l in the heap, and n in the graph (formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi? ⇓ l ∧ (Γ1,∆1) `
y.pi? ⇓ n). By assumption, l = l′.
20 T. JENSEN, F. KIRCHNER, AND D. PICHARDIE
both paths are modified by the f-redirection: we can find two paths pi? and pi
′
? such
that y.pi? leads to l in the heap and n in the graph, and y.pi
′
? leads to l
′ in the heap and
n in the graph (formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi? ⇓ l ∧ (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pi? ⇓ n ∧ 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi′? ⇓
l′ ∧ (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pi′? ⇓ n). By assumption, l = l′.
In all combinations, l = l′ in h1. Since the rule for field assignment in the operational
semantics preserves the locations, then l = l′ in h2.
This concludes the proof of 〈ρ1, h1[(ρ1(x), f) 7→ ρ1(y)], A1〉 ∼ (Γ1,∆1[n, f 7→ Γ(y)],Θ1)
when n ∈ Θ.
If c ≡ x .f :=y and n = Γ(x) /∈ Θ here n may represent multiple concrete cells in h.
Let σ1 and σ2 be the mappings defined, respectively, by the hypothesis (Γ1,∆1,Θ1) v
(Γ2,∆2,Θ2) and (Γ1,∆1[n, f 7→ Γ1(y)],Θ1) v (Γ2,∆2,Θ2). The first premise of the proof is
proved by examining a fixed path pi in (ρ2, h2,Γ2,∆2) that ends in l0 in the concrete heap,
and n′0 in the abstract graph. Applying Lemma 3.7 to this path (formally, instantiating
l by ρ1(x), l
′ by ρ1(y), lf by l0, pi by y, and pi′ by pi) yields two possibilities. The first
alternative is when pi is not modified by the f -redirection (formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi ⇓ l0).
Lemma 3.3 then asserts the existence of a node n0 that pi evaluates to in (ρ1, h1,Γ1,∆1)
(formally, (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ n0 with n′0 = σ1(n0)). Moreover, by assumption n0 and l0 are
in correspondence (formally, 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  l0 ∼ n0). To prove that l0 and n′0 are
in correspondence, we refer to the auxiliary type interpretation rule in Fig. 5, and prove
that given a path pi0 that verifies 〈ρ2, h2〉 ` pi0 ⇓ l0, the proposition (Γ2,∆2) ` pi0 ⇓ n′0
holds. Using Lemma 3.7 on pi0 (formally, instantiating l by ρ1(x), l
′ by ρ1(y), lf by l0, pi
by y, and pi′ by pi0), the only non-immediate case is when pi0 goes through f . In this case,
pi0 = piz.f.pi1.f. . . . .f.pin.f.pif , and we can reconstruct this as a path to n
′
0 in (Γ2,∆2) by
assuming there are two nodes n′x and n′y such that σ1(Γ1(x)) = n′x and σ1(Γ1(y)) = n′y, and
observing:
• 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` piz ⇓ ρ1(x) thus (Γ1,∆1) ` piz ⇓ Γ1(x) by assumption. Because access path
evaluation is monotonic wrt. mappings (a direct consequence of clause (ST2) in the
definition of sub-typing), we can derive (Γ2,∆2) ` piz ⇓ n′x;
• for i ∈ [1, n], 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pii ⇓ ρ1(x) thus by assumption (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pii ⇓ Γ1(x). By
again using the monotony of access path evaluation, we can derive (Γ2,∆2) ` y.pii ⇓ n′x;
• 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pif ⇓ l0 thus by assumption (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pif ⇓ n0. Hence (Γ2,∆2) ` y.pif ⇓ n′0
by n′0 = σ1(n0) and due to monotonicity.
• in ∆1[n, f 7→ Γ1(y)], n = Γ1(x) points to Γ1(y) by f . Note that because the types
Γ1,∆1,Θ1 and Γ1,∆1[n, f 7→ Γ1(y)],Θ1 share the environment Γ1, we have σ2(Γ1(x)) =
σ1(Γ1(x)) = n
′
x and σ2(Γ1(y)) = σ1(Γ1(y)) = n
′
y. Hence in ∆2, n
′
x points to n
′
y by f ,
thanks to the monotonicity of σ2.
This concludes the proof of (Γ2,∆2) ` pi0 ⇓ n′0. The cases when n′x and n′y do not exist are
easily dismissed; we refer the reader to the Coq development for more details.
We now go back to our first application of Lemma 3.7 and tackle the second alterna-
tive – when pi is indeed modified by the f -redirection. Here pi can be decomposed into
piz.f.pi1.f. . . . .f.pin.f.pif . We first find the node in ∆1 that corresponds to the location
l0: for this we need to find a path in (ρ1, h1,Γ2,∆2) that leads to both l0 and n
′
0 (in
order to apply Lemma 3.3, we can no longer assume, as in the first alternative, that pi
leads to l0 in 〈ρ1, h1〉). Since 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pif ⇓ l0, the path y.pif might be a good can-
didate: we prove that it points to n′0 in ∆2. Assume the existence of two nodes n′x and
n′y in ∆2 such that n′x = σ1(Γ1(x)) = σ2(Γ1(x)) and n′y = σ1(Γ1(y)) = σ2(Γ1(y)) (the
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occurrences of non-existence are dismissed by reducing them, respectively, to the contra-
dictory case when Γ2(x) = >, and to the trivial case when n′0 = >; the equality be-
tween results of σ1 and σ2 stems from the same reasons as in bullet 4 previously). From
the first part of the decomposition of pi one can derive, by assumption, that piz leads to
Γ1(x) in ∆1, and, by monotonicity, to n
′
x in ∆2 (formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` piz ⇓ ρ1(x) entails
(Γ1,∆1) ` piz ⇓ Γ1(x) implies (Γ2,∆2) ` piz ⇓ n′x). Similarly, we can derive that for any
i ∈ [1, n], (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pii ⇓ Γ1(x). We use monotonicity both to infer that in ∆2, n′x
points to n′y by f , and that for any i ∈ [1, n] (Γ2,∆2) ` y.pii ⇓ n′x. From these three
statements on ∆2, we have (Γ2,∆2) ` piz.f.pi1.f. . . . .f.pin ⇓ n′x, and by path decomposition
(Γ2,∆2) ` y.pif ⇓ n′0. This allows us to proceed and apply Lemma 3.3, asserting the exis-
tence of a node n0 in (ρ1, h1,∆1,Γ1) that y.pif evaluates to (formally, (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pif ⇓ n0
with n′0 = σ1(n0)). Moreover, by assumption n0 and l0 are in correspondence (formally,
〈ρ1, h1, A1〉 , (Γ1,∆1)  l0 ∼ n0). The proof schema from here on is quite similar to what
was done for the first alternative. As previously, we demonstrate that l0 and n
′
0 are in corre-
spondence by taking a path pi0 such that 〈ρ2, h2〉 ` pi0 ⇓ l0 and proving (Γ2,∆2) ` pi0 ⇓ n′0.
As previously, using Lemma 3.7 on pi0 (formally, instantiating l by ρ1(x), l
′ by ρ1(y), lf by
l0, pi by y, and pi
′ by pi0), the only non-immediate case is when pi0 goes through f . In this
case, pi0 = pi
′
z.f.pi
′
1.f. . . . .f.pi
′
n.f.pi
′
f , and we can reconstruct this as a path to n
′
0 in (Γ2,∆2)
by observing:
• 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi′z ⇓ ρ1(x) thus (Γ1,∆1) ` pi′z ⇓ Γ1(x) by assumption. Monotonicity yields
(Γ2,∆2) ` pi′z ⇓ n′x;
• for i ∈ [1, n], 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi′i ⇓ ρ1(x) thus by assumption (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pi′i ⇓ Γ1(x), and by
monotonicity we can derive (Γ2,∆2) ` y.pi′i ⇓ n′x;
• 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pif ⇓ l0 thus since l0 and n0 are in correspondence, (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pif ⇓ n0.
Hence (Γ2,∆2) ` y.pif ⇓ n′0 by n′0 = σ1(n0) and by monotonicity.
This concludes the proof of (Γ2,∆2) ` pi0 ⇓ n′0, hence the demonstration of the first premise.
We are now left with the second premise, stating the unicity of strong node represen-
tation. Assume n ∈ Θ2 can be reached by two paths pi and pi′ in ρ2, h2,Γ2,∆2, we use
Lemma 3.7 to decompose both paths. The following cases arise:
neither path is modified by the f-redirection: formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi ⇓ l ∧ 〈ρ1, h1〉 `
pi′ ⇓ l′. Lemma 3.3 ensures the existence of n′ such that n = σ1(n′) and (Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓
n′ ∧ (Γ1,∆1) ` pi′ ⇓ n′ Thus by assumption, l = l′.
one of the paths is modified by the f-redirection: without loss of generality, assume
〈ρ1, h1〉 ` pi ⇓ l, and pi′ = pi0.f.pi1.f. . . . .f.pin.f.pif with 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pif ⇓ l′. From the first
concrete path expression, Lemma 3.3 ensures that there is n′ such that n = σ1(n′), and
(Γ1,∆1) ` pi ⇓ n′. Moreover, by assumption there exists a strong node n′′ in ∆1 that y.pif
leads to, and that is mapped to n by σ1 (formally, n = σ1(n
′′) and (Γ1,∆1) ` y.pif ⇓ n′′).
Clause (ST3) of the definition of subtyping states the uniqueness of strong source nodes:
thus n′ = n′′, and we conclude by assumption that l = l′.
both paths are modified by the f-redirection: Lemma 3.7 provides two paths pif and
pi′f such that y.pif leads to l, and y.pi
′
f leads to l
′ in the heap (formally, 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi? ⇓
l∧ 〈ρ1, h1〉 ` y.pi′? ⇓ l′). As in the previous case, we use the assumption and clause (ST3)
of main sub-typing definition to exhibit the common node n′ in ∆1 that is pointed to by
both paths. By assumption, l = l′.
This concludes the demonstration of the second premise, and of the c ≡ x .f :=y case in our
global induction.
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Theorem 3.10 (Type soundness). If ` p then all methods m declared in the program p are
secure, i.e., respect their copy policy.
Proof. [See Coq proof Soundness.soundness [1]] Given a method m and a copy signa-
ture Copy(X){τ} attached to it, we show that for all heaps h1, h2 ∈ Heap, local environments
ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Env , locally allocated locations A1, A2 ∈ P(Loc), and variables x, y ∈ Var ,
(x :=mcn:X (y), 〈ρ1, h1, A1〉) 〈ρ2, h2, A2〉 implies ρ2, h2, x |= τ.
Following the rule defining the semantics of calls to copy methods, we consider the
situation where there exists a potential overriding of m, Copy(X ′) m(a):=c such that
(c, 〈ρ[a 7→ ρ1(y)], h1, ∅〉) 〈ρ′, h2, A′〉.
Writing τ ′ for the policy attached to X ′, we know that τ ⊆ τ ′. By Lemma 2.4, it is then
sufficient to prove that ρ2, h2, x |= τ ′ holds.
By typability of Copy(X ′) m(a):=c, there exist Γ′,Γ,∆,Θ such that Γ′(ret) = nτ ,
(Γ,∆,Θ) v (Γ′,∆τ , {nτ}) and [ · 7→ ⊥][x 7→ >out ], ∅, ∅ ` c : Γ,∆,Θ.
Using Theorem 3.9, we know that 〈ρ′, h2, A′〉 ∼ (Γ,∆,Θ) holds and by subtyping be-
tween (Γ,∆,Θ) and (Γ′,∆τ , {nτ}) we obtain that 〈ρ′, h2, A′〉 ∼ (Γ′,∆τ , {nτ}) holds. Theo-
rem 3.2 then immediately yields that ρ2, h2, x |= τ .
4. Inference
In order to type-check a method with the previous type system, it is necessary to infer
intermediate types at each loop header, conditional junction points and weak field assign-
ment point. A standard approach consists in turning the previous typing problem into a
fixpoint problem in a suitable sup-semi-lattice structure. This section presents the lattice
that we put on (T ,v). Proofs are generally omitted by lack of space but can be found in
the companion report. Typability is then checked by computing a suitable least-fixpoint
in this lattice. We end this section by proposing a widening operator that is necessary to
prevent infinite iterations.
Lemma 4.1. The binary relation v is a preorder on T .
Proof. The relation is reflexive because for all type T ∈ T , T vid T . The relation is
transitive because if there exists types T1, T2, T3 ∈ T such that T1 vσ1 T2 and T2 vσ2 T3
for some fusion maps σ1 and σ2 then T1 vσ3 T3 for the fusion map σ3 define by σ3(n) =
σ2(σ1(n)) if σ1(n) ∈N or > otherwise.
We write ≡ for the equivalence relation defined by T1 ≡ T2 if and only if T1 v T2 and
T2 v T1. Although this entails that v is a partial order structure on top of (T ,≡), equality
and order testing remains difficult using only this definition. Instead of considering the
quotient of T with ≡, we define a notion of well-formed types on which v is antisymmetric.
To do this, we assume that the set of nodes, variable names and field names are countable
sets and we write ni (resp. xi and fi) for the ith node (resp. variable and field). A type
(Γ,∆,Θ) is well-formed if every node in ∆ is reachable from a node in Γ and the nodes in
∆ follow a canonical numbering based on a breadth-first traversal of the graph. Any type
can be garbage-collected into a canonical well-formed type by removing all unreachable
nodes from variables and renaming all remaining nodes using a fixed strategy based on a
total ordering on variable names and field names and a breadth-first traversal. We call
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// I n i t i a l i z a t i o n .
// α−nodes are se t s in t .
// α−t rans i t i on s can be
// non−determin i s t i c .
α = lift(Γ1,Γ2,∆1 ∪∆2)
// Determinize α−t rans i t i on s :
// s ta r t with the entry points .
for {(x, t); (x, t′)} ⊆ (Γ1 × Γ2) {
fusion({t, t′})
}
// Determinize α−t rans i t i on s :
// propagate ins ide the graph .
while ∃u ∈ α, ∃f ∈ Field , |succ(u, f)| > 1 {
fusion(succ(u,f))
}
// α i s now f u l l y determinized :
// convert i t back into a type .
(Γ,∆,Θ) = ground(Γ1,Γ2,α)
// S i s a set of t ∈ t .
// LSM denotes a node labe l l ed by S .
void fusion (S) {
// Create a new α−node .
NDG node n = LSM
α← α+ n
// Recreate a l l edges from the fused
// nodes on the new node .
for t ∈ S {
for f ∈ Field {
if ∃u, α(t, f) = u {
// Outbound edges .
α← α with (n, f) 7→ u
}
if ∃n′, α(n′, f) = t {
// Inbound edges .
α← α with (n′, f) 7→ n
}}
// Delete the fused node .
α← α− t
}}
Figure 10. Join Algorithm
this transformation gc. The following example shows the effect of gc using a canonical
numbering.
x1
⊥
⊥ !
x2 x3
f1 f2 f2
f1
f1 f2f1
f2
f1!
x1
⊥ ⊥ !
x2 x3
f1 f2 f2
f1
f1 f2f1
f2
n1
n2 n3
n4 n5
gc
f2
Since by definition, v only deals with reachable nodes, the gc function is a ≡-morphism
and respects type interpretation. This means that an inference engine can at any time
replace a type by a garbage-collected version. This is useful to perform an equivalence test
in order to check whether a fixpoint iteration has ended.
Lemma 4.2. For all well-formed types T1, T2 ∈ T , T1 ≡ T2 iff T1 = T2.
Definition 4.3. Let unionsq be an operator that merges two types according to the algorithm in
Fig. 10.
The procedure has T1 = (Γ1,∆1,Θ1) and T2 = (Γ2,∆2,Θ2) as input, then takes the
following steps.
(1) It first makes the disjunct union of ∆1 and ∆2 into a non-deterministic graph (ndg) α,
where nodes are labelled by sets of elements in t. This operation is performed by the
lift function, that maps nodes to singleton nodes, and fields to transitions.
(2) It joins together the nodes in α referenced by Γi using the fusion algorithm
6.
6Remark that Γi-bindings are not represented in α, but that node set fusions are trivially traceable. This
allows us to safely ignore Γi during the following step and still perform a correct graph reconstruction.
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// Convert a type to an NDG
NDG lift (Γ1,Γ2,∆) {
NDG α = undef
for x ∈ Var {
α← α+ L{Γ1(x)}M + L{Γ2(x)}M
}
for n ∈ ∆ {
if ∃f ∈ Fields, ∃b ∈ BaseType,∆[n, f ] = b {
α← α+ L{n}M + L{b}M
α← α with (L{n}M, f) 7→ L{b}M
}}
return α
}
// Convert an NDG to a type
T ground (Γ1,Γ2,α) {
(Var → t) Γ = λx.⊥
∆ ∆ = undef
for N ∈ α {
for x ∈ Var ,Γ1(x) ∈ N ∨ Γ2(x) ∈ N {
Γ← Γ with x 7→ N↓
}}
for N,N ′ ∈ α {
if α(N, f) = N ′ {
∆← ∆ with (N↓, f) 7→ N ′↓
}}
return (Γ,∆)
}
// ≤σ−sup function
BaseType ↓ (N) {
if > ∈ N return >
else if ∀c ∈ N, c = ⊥ return ⊥
else return freshNode()
}
Figure 11. Auxiliary join functions
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Figure 12. An example of join
(3) Then it scans the ndg and merges all nondeterministic successors of nodes.
(4) Finally it uses the ground function to recreate a graph ∆ from the now-deterministic
graph α. This function operates by pushing a node set to a node labelled by the
≤σ-sup of the set. The result environment Γ is derived from Γi and α before the
∆-reconstruction.
All state fusions are recorded in a map σ which binds nodes in ∆1 ∪ ∆2 to nodes in ∆.
Figure 11 contains the auxiliary functions used in the above procedure. Figure 12 unfolds
the algorithm on a small example.
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Theorem 4.4. The operator unionsq defines a sup-semi-lattice on types.
Proof. First note that σ1 and σ2, the functions associated with the two respective sub-typing
relations, can easily be reconstructed from σ.
Upper bound: Let (T, σ) = T1unionsqT2: we prove that T1 v T and T2 v T . Hypothesis (ST2)
is discharged by case analysis, on t1 and on t2. The general argument used is that the
join algorithm does not delete any edges, thus preserving all paths in the initial graphs.
Least of the upper bounds: Let (T, σ) = T1 unionsq T2. Assume there exists T ′ such that
T1 v T ′ and T2 v T ′. Then we prove that T v T ′. The proof consists in checking
that the join algorithm produces, at each step, an intermediary pseudo-type T such
that T v T ′. The concrete nature of the algorithm drives the following, more detailed
decomposition.
(1) Given a function σ, define a state mapping function ≤τ , and a vσ-like relation vτ
on non-deterministic graphs. The aim with this relation is to emulate the properties
of vσ, lifting the partial order ≤σ on nodes to sets of nodes (cells). Lift T ′ into an
ndg α′.
(2) Using the subtyping relations between T1, T2, and T
′, establish that the disjunct
union and join steps produce an intermediary ndg β such that β vτ α′.
(3) Ensure that the fusions operated by the join algorithm in β produce an ndg γ such
that γ vτ α′. This is done by case analysis, and depending on whether the fusion
takes place during the first entry point processing phase, or if it occurs later.
(4) Using the t-lattice, show that the ground operation on the ndg γ produces a type T
that is a sub-type of T ′.
The poset structure does have infinite ascending chains, as shown by the following example.
f⊥x ...! x ⊥ ! f! x ⊥f... ...!
Fixpoint iterations may potentially result in such an infinite chain so we have then to rely
on a widening [9] operator to enforce termination of fixpoint computations. Here we follow
a pragmatic approach and define a widening operator ∇ ∈ T ×T → T that takes the result
of unionsq and that collapses together (with the operator fusion defined above) any node n and
its predecessors such that the minimal path reaching n and starting from a local variable is
of length at least 2. This is illustrated by the following example.
f
x ⊥f fx ⊥f f
Collapse(
)Widen( , =
f
x ⊥f f ) = fx f
This ensures the termination of the fixpoint iteration because the number of nodes is then
bounded by 2N with N the number of local variables in the program.
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5. Experiments
The policy language and its enforcement mechanism have been implemented in the form
of a security tool for Java bytecode. Standard Java @interface declarations are used to
specify native annotations, which enable development environments such as Eclipse to parse,
identify and auto-complete @Shallow, @Deep, and @Copy tags. Source code annotations
are being made accessible to bytecode analysis frameworks. Both the policy extraction and
enforcement components are implemented using the Javalib/Sawja static analysis libraries7
to derive annotations and intermediate code representations, and to facilitate the creation
of an experimental Eclipse plugin.
In its standard mode, the tool performs a modular verification of annotated classes.
We have run experiments on several classes of the standard library (specially in the package
java.util) and have successfully checked realistic copy signatures for them. These experi-
ments have also confirmed that the policy enforcement mechanism facilitates re-engineering
into more compact implementations of cloning methods in classes with complex dependen-
cies, such as those forming the gnu.xml.transform package. For example, in the Stylesheet
class an inlined implementation of multiple deep copy methods for half a dozen fields can
be rewritten to dispatch these functionalities to the relevant classes, while retaining the ex-
pected copy policy. This is made possible by the modularity of our enforcement mechanism,
which validates calls to external cloning methods as long as their respective policies have
been verified. As expected, some cloning methods are beyond the reach of the analysis. We
have identified one such method in GNU Classpath’s TreeMap class, where the merging of
information at control flow merge points destroys too much of the inferred type graph. A
disjunctive form of abstraction seems necessary to verify a deep copy annotation on such
programs.
The analysis is also capable of processing un-annotated methods, albeit with less pre-
cision than when copy policies are available—this is because it cannot rely on annotations
to infer external copy method types. Nevertheless, this capability was used to test the tool
on two large code bases. The 17000 classes in Sun’s rt.jar and the 7000 others in the
GNU Classpath have passed our scanner un-annotated. Among the 459 clone() methods
we found in these classes, only 15 have been rejected because of an assignment or method
call on non-local memory, as explained in Section 3.4. Assignment on non-local memory
means here that the copying method is updating fields of other objects than the result of
the copy itself. For such examples, our shape analysis seems too coarse to track the de-
pendencies between sources and copy targets. For 78 methods we were unable to infer the
minimal, shallow signature {} (the same signature as java.lang.Object.clone()). In some
cases, for instance in the DomAttr class, this will happen when the copy method returns
the result of another, unannotated method call, and can be mitigated with additional copy
annotations. In other cases, merges between abstract values result in precision losses: this
is, for instance, the case for the clone method of the TreeMap class, as explained above.
Our prototype confirms the efficiency of the enforcement technique: these verifications
took about 25s to run on stock hardware. The prototype, the Coq formalization and
proofs, as well as examples of annotated classes can be found at http://www.irisa.
fr/celtique/ext/clones.
7http://sawja.inria.fr
SECURE THE CLONES 27
6. Related Work
Several proposals for programmer-oriented annotations of Java programs have been pub-
lished following Bloch’s initial proposal of an annotation framework for the Java language
[5]. These proposals define the syntax of the annotations but often leave their exact se-
mantics unspecified. A notable exception is the set of annotations concerning non-null
annotations [11] for which a precise semantic characterization has emerged [12]. Concern-
ing security, the GlassFish environment in Java offers program annotations of members of
a class (such as @DenyAll or @RolesAllowed) for implementing role-based access control
to methods.
To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first to propose a formal, se-
mantically founded framework for secure cloning through program annotation and static
enforcement. The closest work in this area is that of Anderson et al. [3] who have designed
an annotation system for C data structures in order to control sharing between threads.
Annotation policies are enforced by a mix of static and run-time verification. On the run-
time verification side, their approach requires an operator that can dynamically “cast” a cell
to an unshared structure. In contrast, our approach offers a completely static mechanism
with statically guaranteed alias properties.
Aiken et al. proposes an analysis for checking and inferring local non-aliasing of data [2].
They propose to annotate C function parameters with the keyword restrict to ensure that
no other aliases to the data referenced by the parameter are used during the execution of
the method. A type and effect system is defined for enforcing this discipline statically.
This analysis differs from ours in that it allows aliases to exist as long as they are not used
whereas we aim at providing guarantees that certain parts of memory are without aliases.
The properties tracked by our type system are close to escape analysis [4, 7] but the analyses
differ in their purpose. While escape analysis tracks locally allocated objects and tries to
detect those that do not escape after the end of a method execution, we are specifically
interested in tracking locally allocated objects that escape from the result of a method, as
well as analyse their dependencies with respect to parameters.
Our static enforcement technique falls within the large area of static verification of heap
properties. A substantial amount of research has been conducted here, the most prominent
being region calculus [18], separation logic [15] and shape analysis [16]. Of these three
approaches, shape analysis comes closest in its use of shape graphs. Shape analysis is a
large framework that allows to infer complex properties on heap allocated data-structures
like absence of dangling pointers in C or non-cyclicity invariants. In this approach, heap cells
are abstracted by shape graphs with flexible object abstractions. Graph nodes can either
represent a single cell, hence allowing strong updates, or several cells (summary nodes).
Materialization allows to split a summary node during cell access in order to obtain a node
pointing to a single cell. The shape graphs that we use are not intended to do full shape
analysis but are rather specialized for tracking sharing in locally allocated objects. We use
a different naming strategy for graph nodes and discard all information concerning non-
locally allocated references. This leads to an analysis which is more scalable than full shape
analysis, yet still powerful enough for verifying complex copy policies as demonstrated in
the concrete case study java.util.LinkedList.
Noble et al. [14] propose a prescriptive technique for characterizing the aliasing, and
more generally, the topology of the object heap in object-oriented programs. This technique
is based on alias modes which have evolved into the notion of ownership types [8]. In this
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setting, the annotation @Repr is used to specify that an object is owned by a specific object.
It is called a representation of its owner. After such a declaration, the programmer must
manipulate the representation in order to ensure that any access path to this object should
pass trough its owner. Such a property ensures that a @Repr field must be a @Deep field
in any copying method. Still, a @Deep field is not necessarily a @Repr field since a copying
method may want to deeply clone this field without further interest in the global alias
around it. Cloning seems not to have been studied further in the ownership community and
ownership type checking is generally not adapted to flow-sensitive verification, as required
by the programming pattern exhibited in existing code. In this example, if we annotate
the field next and previous with @Repr, the clone local variable will not be able to
keep the same ownership type at line 12 and at line 26. Such a an example would require
ownership type systems to track the update of a reference in order to catch that any path
to a representation has been erased in the final result of the method.
We have aimed at annotations that together with static analysis allows to verify existing
cloning methods. Complementary to our approach, Drossopoulou and Noble [10] propose a
system that generate cloning methods from annotation inpired by ownership types.
7. Conclusions and Perspectives
Cloning of objects is an important aspect of exchanging data with untrusted code. Cur-
rent language technology for cloning does not provide adequate means for defining and
enforcing a secure copy policy statically; a task which is made more difficult by important
object-oriented features such as inheritance and re-definition of cloning methods. We have
presented a flow-sensitive type system for statically enforcing copy policies defined by the
software developer through simple program annotations. The annotation formalism deals
with dynamic method dispatch and addresses some of the problems posed by redefinition
of cloning methods in inheritance-based object oriented programming language (but see
Section 2.3 for a discussion of current limitations). The verification technique is designed to
enable modular verification of individual classes. By specifically targeting the verification
of copy methods, we consider a problem for which it is possible to deploy a localized version
of shape analysis that avoids the complexity of a full shape analysis framework. This means
that our method can form part of an extended, security-enhancing Java byte code verifier
which of course would have to address, in addition to secure cloning, a wealth of other
security policies and security guidelines as e.g., listed on the CERT web site for secure Java
programming [6].
The present paper constitutes the formal foundations for a secure cloning framework.
All theorems except those of Section 4 have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant.
Mechanization was particularly challenging because of the storeless nature of our type in-
terpretation but in the end proved to be of great help to get the soundness arguments
right.
Several issues merit further investigations in order to develop a full-fledged software
security verification tool. The extension of the policy language to be able to impose policies
on fields defined in sub-classes should be developed (cf. discussion in Section 2.3). We believe
that the analysis defined in this article can be used to enforce such policies but their precise
semantics remains to be defined. In the current approach, virtual methods without copy
policy annotations are considered as black boxes that may modify any object reachable from
its arguments. An extension of our copy annotations to virtual calls should be worked out
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if we want to enhance our enforcement technique and accept more secure copying methods.
More advanced verifications will be possible if we develop a richer form of type signatures
for methods where the formal parameters may occur in copy policies, in order to express a
relation between copy properties of returning objects and parameter fields. The challenge
here is to provide sufficiently expressive signatures which at the same time remain humanly
readable software contracts. The current formalisation has been developed for a sequential
model of Java. We conjecture that the extension to interleaving multi-threading semantics
is feasible and that it can be done without making major changes to the type system because
we only manipulate thread-local pointers.
An other line of work could be to consider the correctness of equals() methods with
respect to copying methods, since we generally expect x.clone().equals(x) to be true. The
annotation system is already in good shape for such a work but a static enforcement may
require a major improvement of our specifically tailored shape analysis.
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